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One frequently litigated issue is the extent to which a court
should recognize an out-of-state child custody or support decree. It seems
to this author that such a decree is never binding (except for a decree
which finally terminates parental rights for cause) but that as a matter
of comity a court ought to give great weight to an out-of-state decree,
absent a major change in circumstances. The constitutional issue is
whether the court must recognize the foreign decree. Clearly the decree
is not entitled to fall faith and credit when it is subject to modification
where made, and a change in circumstances can be shown.1 A convincing
argument can be made for the proposition that, when the child and one
parent are domiciled in Ohio, the Ohio court can redetermine issues of
custody and support, without any showing of a change in circumstances
since the date of the foreign decree. The argument is that the policy
basis of the custody determination, i.e., the best interest of the child, out-
weighs the interest in finality of litigation, the policy basis of the full
faith and credit clause. This problem came before the United States
Supreme Court in 1958, and the Court avoided the question. In 1962
the Court was again faced with the issue, and again it was able to avoid
passing on the question by apparently finding that the original decree
was subject to modification without a change in circumstances where ren-
dered, so it could be changed elsewhere on the same basis.'
The same problem arose in two Ohio cases. In Ex parte Elliott4 a
court of appeals held, where no change in circumstances had occurred,
that a Maryland decree of child custody would be enforced in Ohio. It is
not clear from the opinion whether the court followed the Maryland de-
cree because of comity or because it felt compelled to do so under the
full faith and credit clause. In the second case the court referred to the
possibility that an Ohio decree could be relitigated in New York as one




When a husband is sued for divorce he will occasionally convey or
mortgage his property while the suit is pending, either in an attempt to
1. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 166 Ohio St.
203, 141 NE.2d 172 (1957).
2. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958).
3. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
4. 114 Ohio App. 533, 183 N.E.2d 804 (1961).
5. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 180 N.E.2d 205 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
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put the property beyond his wife's reach or in a good faith attempt to
secure the costs of the divorce action. Foundation Say. & Loan v. Rosen-
baum6 points out that such an attempt, whether in good faith or not, is
ineffective as against the wife. The lis pendens statute, Ohio Revised
Code section 2703.26, provides that while an action is pending no third
person can acquire an interest in the "subject of action" as against the
plaintiff's tide. Apparently the wife's action for alimony is construed as
placing all of the husband's property into the category, "subject of the
action."
Grounds and Defenses
In theory the grounds for divorce are mutually exclusive, but there
is a wide divergence between theory and practice. Alcoholism is not a
ground, but habitual intoxication is, although the courts are reluctant
to grant a divorce on this ground except for chronic alcoholism. How-
ever, a recent case points out that heavy drinking, although not inter-
fering with the husband's job, is cruelty when it is coupled with quarrels
and nagging.7
It is dear that the resumption of a normal marital relationship fol-
lowing an act of marital aggression is a condonation of the aggression
and is a valid defense to an action for divorce. It is not so clear that it
is also a defense to an action for alimony only, nor is it dear whether
condonation is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded. A related
issue is whether a single act of sexual intercourse constitutes condonation.
On all three issues the court is concerned with public policy and with
the possibility of fraud on the court.
The Ohio cases illustrate that public policy is a test that varies with
the specific situation. The two leading cases involving cohabitation
during an alimony action came to opposite conclusions.8 As to divorce,
the best known Ohio case is Huffine v. Huffine,9 in which the Van
Wert County Common Pleas Court held that a single act of sexual inter-
course is condonation. On the other hand, in Lowman v. Lowman"° the
6. 113 Ohio App. 501, 171 N.E.2d 359 (1960). In this case the wife had a legal interest
in the property which prevailed as against a judgment creditor of the husband. The same rule
would apply where the wife has no legal interest but claims an equitable interest and asks for
the property as alimony. Cook v. Mozer, 108 Ohio St. 30, 140 N.E. 590 (1923).
7. Hardt v. Hardt, 182 N.E.2d 9 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
8. In England v. England, 92 Ohio App. 527, 110 N.E.2d 35 (1952), the court held that
a resumption of a regular marital relation would bar an alimony action, but the court had no
objection to the parties living under the same roof, apparently without resumption of sex
relations. The court raised no presumption of condonation as it was hopeful that reconcilia-
tion would occur. In Smith v. Smith, 86 Ohio App. 479, 92 N.E.2d 418 (1949), the court
held that an action for alimony is barred by condonation, cohabitation is condonation, and
cohabitation will be presumed from the living together of husband and wife in the same house.
9. 74 N.E.2d 764 (Ohio C.P. 1949).
10. 166 Ohio St. 1, 139 N.E.2d 1 (1956).
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supreme court found that a single act of sexual intercourse was not con-
donation because there was no other evidence of a resumption of normal
relations. In the latest case the Tuscarawas County Common Pleas Court
followed Huffine without mentioning Lowman and held that condona-
tion is a defense to both alimony and divorce, that it need not be pleaded,
and that a single act of intercourse amounts to condonation."
ALIMONY
In most states a valid marriage is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an
action for divorce. The rule does not apply in Ohio, as our divorce
statute sets forth bigamy as a ground for divorce. It had been assumed
for many years that the victim of a bigamous marriage had an option.
She could waive alimony by asking for an annulment, or she could get
a divorce and alimony. But in 1952 in Eggleston v. Egglestone the Ohio
Supreme Court held that the wife could get alimony although the mar-
riage was void as bigamous and, further, that the divorce statute was the
exclusive remedy. In Jones v. Jones"3 a court of appeals held that a wife
who had entered into a good faith marriage with a man who already
had a wife could not sue for alimony only. Without discussion or cita-
tion the court held that an alimony action, unaccompanied by a suit for
divorce, could not be maintained unless there was a legally valid mar-
riage. The only prior case on this issue was a 1923 court of appeals
decision which antedates Eggleston.4
It seems to the author that the alimony statute does not require this
result and that it is inconsistent to hold that the good faith victim of a
bigamous marriage can get alimony through a divorce action but not
through an alimony action. Even in states which do not provide divorce
as a remedy in the bigamy situation, the courts have held that, where
the husband knew that the marriage was bigamous and the second wife
did not, the husband is estopped from denying her the right of support. 5
Although appellate courts have been generally reluctant to upset a
finding of a trial court on the amount of alimony, there appears to be a
dear trend toward finding an abuse of discretion when the trial court, in
fixing alimony for a middle-aged and presumably unemployable wife,
relies primarily on a division of property rather than on continuing sup-
port. One of the best illustrations of this development is a 1955 Wiscon-
11. Maughan v. Maughan, 184 NXE.2d 628 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
12. 156 Ohio St. 422, 103 N.E.2d 395 (1952).
13. 115 Ohio App. 358, 180 NXE.2d 847 (1962).
14. Wolfer v. Wolfer, 19 Ohio App. 12 (1923) (wife of bigamous marriage cannot recover
in action for alimony only).
15. See Astor v. Astor, 107 So. 2d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958), and cases cited therein.
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sin case.' 6 The result of a 1962 court of appeals case' 7 indicates that the
trend has reached Ohio.
In 1954 a court of appeals held that a separation agreement could
cut off the wife's right to alimony, but, on the theory that everyone is
entitled to his day in court and counsel is needed to make this right ef-
fective, the court held that it would be contrary to public policy to allow
such an agreement to cut off her right to attorney's fees in a subsequent
divorce case."8 The same reasoning should invalidate a separation agree-
ment clause which restricts the allowance for counsel to a set amount, but
a 1962 opinion held that such a restriction is valid.'9
HUSBAND AND WIFE
Two recent Ohio cases2" emphasize the necessity of obtaining a com-
plete inventory of property owned by the spouses before a separation
agreement is drafted. In both cases the courts held that the separation
agreement, which did not clearly spell out the ownership of insurance
on the husband's life, did not cut off the wife's right to the insurance
proceeds where the husband had failed to notify the insurance company
of a change of beneficiary.
In determining the validity of both antenuptial and separation agree-
ments the test is not fairness, but the absence of fraud, and fraud is tested
by a high standard because of the fiduciary relationship that the parties
bear toward one another. However, the burden of establishing fraud is im-
posed on the party who tries to set aside the agreement.2' In Pniewski v.
Przybysz22 the trial court tried to ease the burden by holding that the
antenuptial agreement could be set aside where one party had not had
independent counsel. In reversing, the court of appeals went further
than necessary by stating, not only that independent counsel was not re-
quired, but also that when the parties to such an agreement are mature
individuals they do not stand in a confidential relationship to each
other. 3 It seems clear that this statement was dictum and unnecessary
because there was no breach of a confidential relation. The only case
cited in the opinion on this point24 did not hold that there is no confi-
16. Gordon v. Gordon, 270 Wis. 332, 71 N.W.2d 386 (1955). See 2 NELSON, DivoRcE
AND ANNULMENT § 14.44 (rev. vol. 1961).
17. Johnson v. Johnson, 115 Ohio App. 387, 181 N.E.2d 494 (1962).
18. Sinclair v. Sinclair, 98 Ohio App. 308, 129 N.E.2d 311 (1954).
19. Conner v. Conner, 184 N.E.2d 476 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
20. Cannon v. Hamilton, 174 Ohio St. 268 (1963); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 185 N.E.2d
502 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
21. Miller v. Knight, 115 Ohio App. 485, 185 N.E.2d 770 (1961) (separation agreement);
Hawkins v. Hawkins, 185 N.E.2d 89 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962) (antenuptial agreement).
22. 183 N.E.2d 437 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
23. Id. at 439 (dictum).
24. In re McCready's Estate, 316 Pa. 246, 175 Adt. 554 (1934).
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dential relationship in such a situation, but only that the relationship was
not violated in that case.
CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT
For the second time, an Ohio court has held that the duty of sup-
port and the right of visitation are independent.2" Therefore, a mother
who has custody is entitled to support from the father even though
she has violated the custody order by removing the child from the state
or by denying the husband his visitation rights.2 This question has been
the subject of conflicting decisions in other states, but it seems that the
better view is the one which is developing in Ohio, i.e., that the mother's
violation of a court order should not operate to deprive the child of
needed support.
Under normal conditions the parent's right of custody includes the
right to make major decisions involving the future of the child. Two
cases point out that situations exist in which the decision of the parent
may be overruled by a court. In one case' a probate court ordered the
sterilization of a mentally-retarded teenager who had already had one
illegitimate child. Although Ohio does not have a statute expressly
authorizing involuntary sterilization, as do twenty-six other states," the
court acted under its general equity power and its statutory power to
supervise and care for mentally retarded children. The other case held
that the court could order necessary medical treatment for a child al-
though the parents were opposed for religious reasons."
The lower courts have continued to work out the division of re-
sponsibility in child custody cases between the divorce court and the
juvenile court. Thus it was held that the juvenile court, not the divorce
court, has jurisdiction over a stepchild whose parents are before the
divorce court.8" And, where the juvenile court's jurisdiction has been
invoked to determine custody, it will not be ousted by a subsequent di-
vorce action in the common pleas court8 ' or by a habeas corpus action in
the common pleas court 32
25. Lenzer v. Lenzer, 115 Ohio App. 442, 183 N.E.2d 144 (1962). An Ohio court reached
this conclusion for the first time in Elkind v. Harding, 104 Ohio App. 322, 143 N.E.2d 752
(1951), discussed in Ross, Survey of Ohio Law - Domestic Relations, 9 W. REs. L. REv.
321 (1958).
26. Lenzer v. Lenzer, supra note 25.
27. In re Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962).
28. For a recent survey of sterilization procedures on a national basis, see LINDMAN & Mc-
INTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THm LAw 183-97 (1961).
29. In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
30. Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, 185 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
31. In re Small, 114 Ohio App. 248, 181 N.E.2d 503 (1960).
32. In re Ruth, 176 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
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MODIFICATION, TERMINATION, AND ENFORCEMENT OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS DECREES
In two cases reported during the survey period, it was contended
that a divorce decree should be vacated for fraud.3 Although it is now
clear that an Ohio divorce can be vacated, even after term, both cases
held that the decree would not be vacated: in one case because the mov-
ing party in the action to vacate was aware of the alleged fraud at the
time of the divorce and did not object then, 4 and in the other case
because the moving party failed to comply with section 2325.02 of the
Ohio Revised Code.35 That section applies to fraud as to service, imposes a
five-year statute of limitations, and requires the moving party to file an
answer to the original action.
It is clear that an award of continuing alimony is subject to modifica-
tion for changed circumstances 6 and that an award of a lump sum is not,
in the absence of a clause in the decree reserving jurisdiction to modify.3"
It would seem, therefore, that when a court awards a lump sum, its
jurisdiction is at an end and enforcement should be by execution rather
than contempt. However, in Peters v. Peters8 the Court of Appeals for
Butler County held that contempt was a proper remedy to enforce pay-
ment of a lump-sum alimony award, payable in installments. The court
added, in effect, that it would have held the same way even if the lump
sum were not payable in separate installments,39 on the grounds that
contempt is a swifter and surer method of enforcement than execution,
and that the public interest requires that alimony be preferred, as to en-
forcement measures, over other debts.
ILLEGITIMACY
As in past years, 1962 brought reports of cases involving the burden
of proof in paternity actions," the presumption of legitimacy which
attaches when a child is born to a married woman,41 and one case which
held that an illegitimate child does not qualify as a "child" under a life
insurance beneficiary designation.' The only case which represents a
33. McGill v. McGill, 179 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962); Dreitzler v. Dreitzler, 115
Ohio App. 231, 184 N.E.2d 679 (1961).
34. Dreitzler v. Dreitzler, supra note 33.
35. McGill v. McGill, 179 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
36. Braund v. Braund, 183 N.E.2d 641 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962); Clelland v. Clelland, 110
Ohio App. 546, 166 N.E.2d 428 (1959).
37. Aultman v. Aultman, 167 N.E.2d 377 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
38. 115 Ohio App. 443, 183 N.E.2d 431 (1962).
39. Id. at 447-48, 183 N.E.2d at 434.
40. State ex rel. Allen v. Wagoner, 182 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
41. State ex rel. Satterfield v. Sullivan, 115 Ohio App. 347, 185 N.E.2d 47 (1962).
42. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. McMillan, 171 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
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